Margaret Berger and Aaron Twerski are among the leading scholars in their respective fields of Evidence and Products Liability. I have benefited from their work on many occasions. 1 Precisely because of the deserved re spect and esteem in which Berger and Twerski are held-not to mention the prominence of their forum, the Michigan Law Review-their proposal to create a new "informed choice" cause of action in pharmaceutical litiga tion is likely to receive sympathetic attention. Because I believe that their [Vol. 104: 1961 proposal is ill-conceived and dangerous, I feel compelled (with some trepi dation) to write this response.
Berger and Twerski propose that courts recognize an informed choice cause of action that would allow plaintiffs claiming injury from pharmaceu tical products to recover damages for deprivation of informed choice when (1) the causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff's harm is unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved; (2) the drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to improve lifestyle; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware of the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the drug would have refused to take it; and ( 4) defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk or should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed to provide the requisite information to the physician or pa tient. 2 These guidelines, however, are rather vague. Whether they are meant to apply broadly or narrowly means the difference between a cause of action that would open a Pandora's Box of litigation and one that would be avail able only in limited, perhaps even extraordinary, circumstances. Apparently, Berger and Twerski intend the scope of the informed choice action to be broad indeed. So broad, in fact, that if adopted it could lead to an unprece dented wave of litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers, including lawsuits involving products that are completely safe and effective.
Berger and Twerski suggest that the paradigmatic example illustrating the need for the informed choice cause of action is the failure of plaintiffs to recover damages from the maker of Bendectin. The plaintiffs contended that this morning sickness drug caused their children's birth defects. As demon strated below, in Part I of this Essay, if the proposed informed choice tort's boundaries are broad enough to allow the Bendectin plaintiffs to recover damages, then they are extraordinarily, dangerously broad. Part II of this Essay argues that even if Berger and Twerski had chosen a better example that would allow for a much more limited interpretation of the scope of their proposal, the proposal still has significant weaknesses that render it a very bad idea.
I. I NFORMED C HOICE AND THE B ENDECTIN TR AGEDY
Litigation claiming that Bendectin caused limb reduction and other birth defects began in the late 1970s and did not end until at least 2000. It in volved thousands of plaintiffs and tens of millions of dollars in defense costs, and led to many pioneering judicial rulings excluding plaintiffs' scien tific evidence. Most significant, Bendectin was the underlying subject of ushered in the modem era in which courts subject questioned expert testi mony to meaningful scrutiny to ensure its reliability.
Perhaps because Berger and Twerski seek to "unmask" Daubert, they invoke the Bendectin litigation to justify their informed choice proposal. They suggest that although the Bendectin plaintiffs could not prove causa tion, the Bendectin plaintiffs could have met the criteria they lay out for an informed choice cause of action. If so, a review of the history of the Bendec tin litigation reveals that their proposal is unjust, unworkable, and counterproductive.
Criterion 1: Th e causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff 's harm is unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved.
Neither pioneering Bendectin plaintiff Betty Mekdeci-whose "an guished cry" Berger and Twerski say they are responding to 4 -nor any of the subsequent Bendectin plaintiffs ever had sound reason to believe that Bendectin caused limb reduction birth defects, the main focus of the Ben dectin litigation. In 1977, when Mekdeci brought her lawsuit, fourteen epidemiological studies of varying strength and quality had examined the relationship between Bendectin and birth defects and found no association. 5
While these studies were not powerful enough to rule out some connection between Bendectin and birth defects, they certainly provided no cause for alarm. Bendectin had been on the market since 1956 with no serious doubts raised regarding its safety in the scientific or medical community. Nor did Bendectin contain suspiciously toxic ingredients: one active ingredient of Bendectin was a simple B vitamin, and the other was an ingredient used in a popular over-the-counter sleeping pill. Meanwhile, Mekdeci's evidence that Bendectin did cause birth defects was "remarkably thin." 6 Many chemicals are known not to be teratogens in humans, so the mere fact that pregnant women ingested a pharmaceutical product such as Bendectin did not mean there was an inherent risk. Beyond the mere fact that she ingested Bendectin during pregnancy and later gave birth to a child with a limb reduction birth defect, Mekdeci's evidence of causation consisted primarily of eighty-six reports to the FDA of other women who had also given birth to children with limb reduction defects after taking Bendectin. 7 These reports are the direct source of Mekdeci's complaint, implicitly endorsed by Berger and Twerski, that Bendectin's
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[Vol. 104:1961 manufacturer should have warned of a possible association with birth de fects. 8 Berger and Twerski acknowledge that " [t] he mere fact that a child was born with a limb reduction to a mother who had ingested Bendectin did not necessarily point to Bendectin as the cause of the birth defect." 9 In fact, the mere fact that dozens or even hundreds of children were reported to have been born with limb reductions after their mothers ingested Bendectin doesn't, by itself, even suggest a risk. Approximately thirty million women took Bendectin, and by chance alone there would be ten thousand limb re duction defects among children born to these women. JO Berger and Twerski apparently see the issue of whether Bendectin caused birth defects as "unresolved" at the time of litigation. As noted above, when the Bendectin litigation began, the relevant research was not strong enough to rule out the possibility that Bendectin caused a small in crease in birth defects, but there was no reason to rule in that possibility either. There was never any valid scientific evidence supporting the proposi tion that Bendectin was a teratogen.
As interest in the teratogenicity of Bendectin increased due to the litiga tion, evidence quickly piled up that Bendectin was safe. No animal studies using doses equivalent or even substantially above human therapeutic doses showed teratogenicity.
11 Most epidemiological studies produced no statisti cally significant findings. 12 The few positive studies 13 each found an association with a different, unrelated birth defect, a pattern consistent with random chance or imperfections in the studies, but not with causation by Bendectin. 14 Meanwhile, other studies reported a negative association be-8. Mekdeci said: "I feel like there were certainly enough [adverse reactions of limb reduc tion in children born after their mothers had taken Bendectin to alleviate symptoms of nausea] reported, given our bad reporting system ... to have warranted some kind of acknowledgment of this on the labeling and to physicians." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 257-58 (quoting Deposi tion of Plaintiff Elizabeth Mekdeci).
Putting the case reports aside, should Ms. Mekdeci and others similarly situated have been warned about potential birth defects, given that Bendectin had not been adequately tested to rule out the possibility that it was a relatively weak teratogen? To the extent that physicians reportedly told patients that Bendectin was proven "totally safe" before the 1980s, this information was inaccurate. But given that there was no particular reason to believe that Bendectin caused birth defects, and, as noted above, some reason to believe it didn't, Bendectin was logically in the category of many pharmaceuticals prescribed to pregnant women today, with regard to which doctors say "we can't absolutely guarantee it's safe, but any risk is minimal." 9. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 261.
IO. Robert L. Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent To nogen -Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 337, 340 (1995). It should also be kept in mind that obstetricians were especially likely to report a temporal relationship between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects because of the still-fresh cau tionary example of Thalidomide.
11. Id. at 340. 13. See id. at 89.
14. Brent, supra note 10, at 339 (emphasizing the importance of consistency of results in determining a "real" association). read their article) remains "unresolved" now, one struggles to conceive of any purported causal relationship that they would acknowledge has been resolved.
Criterion 2: The drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomf011 or to improve lifestyle.
According to Berger and Twerski, the "assault on autonomy" through lack of informed consent "is especially egregious in the case of lifestyle drugs where the drug has little therapeutic value." They admit that "there is no bright line that can be drawn between lifestyle and therapeutic drugs," but consider Bendectin to be a lifestyle drug.
34 This suggests that the cate gory of "lifestyle" drug is extremely broad.
Bendectin was used to treat symptoms of pregnancy commonly known as morning sickness, and known in the medical literature as nausea and vomiting of pregnancy ("NVP"). For a much greater number of women, NVP is "merely" extremely un pleasant and somewhat debilitating. Researchers estimate that NVP impairs the daily routine of 35% of pregnant women.
39
Bendectin was the only FDA-approved drug to treat NVP.
40 Withdrawal of Bendectin may have actually slightly increased birth defect rates, as mothers with severe NVP have difficulty getting proper nutrition 4 1 and some pregnant women used "off-label" prescription remedies or "alternative" therapies that had "little, if any, safety information" to relieve their suffer-
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Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 1. Several studies have compared the effects of NVP in the U.S. and Can ada. One study found that in both countries, hospitalization rates for NVP doubled when Bendectin was removed from the market following the litiga tion scare of the early 1980s.
43 Once Bendectin (in a generic version) returned to the Canadian market in 1989, 44 hospitalization rates declined in Canada in parallel with increased prescriptions for the drug, while American hospitalization rates remained constant. 45 Another study concluded that "American patients tended to lose, on average, more weight during their NVP, were hospitalized more often than their Canadian counterparts despite similar distribution of the severity of symptoms, and lost more time from paid work." 46 This study concluded that the absence of Bendectin had caused "American women unwarranted and preventable suffering." 47 The with drawal of Bendectin from the market was, as one article puts it, "an American tragedy." 48
Criterion 3: It is almost certain that a patient made aware of the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the drug would have refused to take it.
Berger and Twerski argue that " [t] here is little doubt that the vast major ity of expectant mothers suffering from the discomfort of morning sickness would have refused to take Bendectin to alleviate their discomfort if told that the drug carried with it an uncertain risk of birth defects to their fe tuses."
49 In fact, this depends on how the "risk" would have been portrayed.
If the risk was portrayed as "there is an uncertain risk of birth defects" from Bendectin, Berger and Twerski are likely correct. If it was portrayed more accurately as "we can never guarantee with absolute certainty that a drug will not cause birth defects, but Bendectin has been used safely for over twenty years, the FDA and the scientific community believe that it is the only drug safe and effective for treating NVP, and there is no reputable evi dence to the contrary," the vast majority of women would have reasonably decided to take Bendectin to relieve NVP. 50
More generally, this raises the issue of what Berger and Twerski con sider a "risk" worth informing patients about. Berger 
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This is how the risk should have been reasonably portrayed to women, and women with mild symptoms of NVP may have chosen to avoid even this "risk." The evidence suggests, however, that some women were inaccurately told by their physicians that Bendectin was "proven safe." For further discussion, see supra note 8. inspired in part by the Davi i 1 and Reyes 52 cases, in which plaintiffs, whose children contracted polio from the oral polio vaccine, sued the manufacturer of the vaccine for not disclosing to patients the (well-established) one in a million risk that the vaccine could itself cause polio. Yet a one in a million risk is so small a risk that, prospectively, no reasonable person would worry about it. Consider that over a two-year period, the average American has a greater than a one in a million chance of being killed by a lightning strike. 53
The one in a million risk is put in even starker perspective when one recog nizes that being vaccinated for polio actually significantly reduced the overall risk of polio to the vaccinee. 54
More generally, a one in a million risk is so low that a drug manufac turer could almost certainly never guarantee that an individual drug (or for that matter, many food products!) poses less than this risk of birth defects.
Does that mean that every product ingested by women of childbearing age need carry a warning, even if it has been studied extensively and shown not to be teratogenic?
Or, returning to the Bendectin example, does the fact that a few outliers and hired guns are willing to speculate that a drug causes birth defects mean that there is a meaningful "risk" of birth defects? If so, every relevant phar maceutical product sold in the United States should carry a warning about any conceivable harm that any credentialed doctor or scientist could imagine may arise from using it.
Criterion 4: Defendant drug company was aware of the potential ri sk or should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the ri sk and failed to provide the requisite information to the physician or patient.
Berger and Twerski conclude that the risk of birth defects from Bendec tin was a "material risk" that should have been disclosed to physicians or patients because "it is impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin 54. The Davis court argued that while the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine was approximately one in a million, the risk of contracting polio from other sources was also approxi mately one in a million, so that a rational person might have chosen not to take the risk from the vaccine. The court, however, failed elementary statistics, which points to the hazards of trusting the judicial system with public risk management. The polio vaccine need be given only once, with the one in a million risk providing lifelong immunity. The one in a million risk of contracting polio otherwise was, by the court's own reckoning, annual, and thus, over a period of years, far greater than the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine. "
It's especially odd that Berger and Twerski use these cases as positive models because it was undisputed in both cases that the risk from the polio vaccine was disclosed to the medical commu nity. Berger and Twerski suggest, see Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 278, that drug manufacturers would escape liability under their "failure to warn" tort if they "alert physicians so they in turn can provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful choice." So by their own lights, the polio vaccine cases should be examples of litigation run amok. is "impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin causes any of these defects, because "proving that Bendectin does not cause birth defects is logically impossible." 58 Under the informed choice proposal, these plaintiffs, like Ms. Mekdeci, would deserve compensation for lack of informed con sent for the nonexistent "risk" to which they were exposed. 5 9
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Thus, considering the four informed choice criteria discussed above in 59. Indeed, Berger and Twerski might allow these plaintiffs to be compensated if they were not apprised of the risk of limb reduction defects even though their children did not suffer this par ticular problem. They praise Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1997), a case in which the plaintiffs were unable to produce any expert evidence of a relationship between the mother's inges tion of Provera and their baby's limb reduction defect. The court nevertheless allowed recovery for "wrongful birth" because the plaintiff's physician failed to warn that at the time of her pregnancy, there was concern that Provera caused congenital defects, including limb reductions. Had the mother been warned she may have aborted the child. The dissent eviscerates the majority's logic, which eliminates proximate cause from the tort of wrongful birth. studies, 67 and preliminary epidemiological studies 6 8 --could, taken together, be sufficient to objectively warrant a warning about a product. 69 But the mere fact that a "qualified" adversarial expert is willing to testify that a product was sufficiently risky to require a warning does not make his testi mony sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702. In addition to the stringent requirements of Rule 702, there are sound reasons why courts are skeptical of "mosaic" testimony. The essential prob lem is that extrapolating from various types of evidence that are individually of dubious value to determine the riskiness of a product or substance inevi tably requires a certain amount of educated guesswork and even speculation.
In a typical courtroom setting, however, the experts engaging in this guess work and speculation will not be neutral scientists chosen because of their expertise and objectivity. They will instead be adversarial experts chosen by the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' attorney knows that they are willing to testify that they agree with his theory of the case.
The problem with such adversarial experts is twofold. Between the outlier problem and the hired gun problem, plaintiffs attor neys have had no difficulty finding qualified experts willing to testify to causal relationships lacking sound scientific support, 73 even when, as was the case with Bendectin, a solid line of epidemiological studies contradicted 67. See Brent, supra note 10, at 342 (stating that in vitro studies "can never establish human teratogenicity by themselves").
68. See Gary Taubes, Ep idemiology Faces its Umits, 269 SCIENCE 164 (1995) (noting that epidemiology is subject to systematic errors, biases, and con founders). 79. Indeed, though they analogize their tort to informed consent in medical practice, Berger and Twerski's proposal could easily be expanded beyond the medical context, and permit individu als to sue based on lack of informed consent to the purported risks from fluoride in the drinking water, pesticide residue on fr uit, brief exposure to carbon monoxide in parking garages, and so on. Certainly, dentists would be on the hook for not warning patients of the "risk" from mercury in B. Juries Are Not Competent to Determine Subtle Risk Assessment Issues [Vol. 104:1961 Berger and Twerski write that their proposal requires juries to decide "whether the signs of risk and their potential gravity were sufficiently strong to require a drug manufacturer to alert physicians so that they in tum can provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful choice." 80 Such risks need not be "significant enough to warrant forceful or drastic action by the FDA such as requiring black box warnings or removing the drug from the market." 8 1 Yet, if data supporting the existence of risk was discovered after the company made its decision not to warn, there is little reason to believe that jurors (or judges) are competent to make such subtle determinations. 8 2 After all, they have no expertise in science in general or risk assessment in particular, are privy only to paid adversarial expert testi mony, and are subject to hindsight bias. 
See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT'L ACADS., DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SAFETY 255-60 (2004
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See generally Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Pe rformance on a Numeracy Scale among Highly Educated Samples, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 37, 37 (2001) (concluding that "even highly educated participants have difficulty with relatively simple numeracy questions"). The problem of lack of jury competence to deal with complex scientific issues is recognized throughout the common law world. Berger and Twerski argue that informed choice plaintiffs should also be permitted to present evidence of causation to the jury. The court would rule on the Rule 702 issue with regard to causation only at the end of the trial. If the court excluded that evidence, "[p ]lain tiffs would then be free to use the testimony of their experts to support their claim for informed choice." 86
The jury, then, would be in the position of knowing that qualified ex perts, relying on what these experts (but not the non-expert judge) believe to be reliable evidence, think that the product in question more likely than not caused the plaintiff's horrible injury; that plaintiff has, due to this injury, suffered grievous and costly physical and emotional harm; and, potentially, that the defendant has allegedly engaged in all sorts of misconduct warrant ing punitive damages. The jury is then supposed to ignore the causation and damages evidence they just heard and dispassionately decide whether the evidence of "risk" presented by the plaintiff 's experts warrants granting the plaintiff emotional distress damages based on lack of informed choice, knowing that if they rule for the defendants on this issue, the plaintiff will receive no compensation.
To expect such dispassion after juries hear evidence on both causation and damages requires an unwarranted belief in the ability of juries both to follow limiting instructions 87 and to ignore their emotions. ss The latter is especially problematic because good trial attorneys are masters at appealing to juries' emotions. s9 One likely outcome in many informed choice cases would be that jurors would implicitly shift the burden to defendants to prove that there was no risk worth warning about. 90 Because, as noted previously, 90. Such implicit burden-shifting already occurs even with regard to causation issues. See, e.g. , Bernstein, supra note 18, at 496 (providing an example from the breast implant litigation). Such burden-shifting would not necessarily trouble Professor Berger, who has previously advocated [Vol. 104:1961 science can't prove a negative, this would mean that the defendants would generally lose.
D. The Proposal Ignores the Problems Inherent to Multiple Trials
Let's assume arguendo that despite the problems noted above, 90% of juries reach the objectively correct conclusion on informed choice claims. A manufacturer of a popular and perfectly safe product could still face thou sands of successful claims.
For example, even with a 90% success rate, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti cals, manufacturer of Bendectin, could have faced liability from over twenty thousand women who claimed that they should have been warned that Ben dectin could cause heart defects in their offspring. One cost of informed choice litigation involves those who, out of fear generated by the publicity attending lawsuits (often stoked by plaintiffs' attorneys and public relations firms they hire), avoid using a safe product that could be useful to them. For example, as a result of the Bendectin litiga tion many women fail to get treatment for nausea during pregnancy because of unfounded fears of teratogenicity. 9 3 For that matter, many doctors became burden-shifting in certain toxic torts cases. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes To wards a New Theory of Justice and To xic To rts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 21 17, 2144-45 (1997). I criticize Berger's proposal and like-minded proposals, while suggesting an alternative mechanism for encouraging corporations to engage in appropriate behavior with regard to risk, in Bernstein, supra note 18.
91. Brent, supra note I 0, at 340 (noting that statistically, one would expect that collectively the women who ingested Bendectin would give birth to two hundred and forty thousand children with congenital heart malformations, the same ratio as for women not exposed to Bendectin).
92. Another possibility, explicitly raised by Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 287-88, is that in the absence of any requirement of individualized inquiry-which generally prevents pharma ceutical cases from being aggregated-informed choice claims would typically be aggregated into massive class actions. This would put defendants in the position of either betting the company on favorable jury verdicts or settling, likely for significantly more than the underlying value of the individual claims. The author thanks Richard Nagareda for suggesting that I address this point.
93.
Paolo awaits Supreme Court decision.
C ONCLUSION
The specific problems Berger and Twerski purport to address with their informed choice proposal-the inadequacy of premarket review for detect ing small but material risks from pharmaceutical products and the failure of the current federal regulatory system to adequately address postmarket safety review-are serious ones. 112 But given the inability of the tort system 108. See Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1991) ("If pharmaceutical companies were required to warn of every suspected risk that could possibly attend the use of a drug, the con suming public would be so barraged with warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness of these warnings.") (emphasis in original); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 85, at 296 ('The most significant social cost generated by requiring [defendants] to warn against remote risks is the re duced effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed towards risks which are not remote."). 113. Otherwise, why require that the plaintiff show that she actually suffered the injury not warned against? Why not let all consumers deprived of their "dignity" through lack of informed choice, injured or not, sue? Also, if Dean Twerski is not implicitly endorsing an end run around Daubert I find it very difficult to reconcile his advocacy of an informed choice tort with his scathing critique of emotional distress damages for asymptomatic asbestos plaintiffs. See James A. Berger and Twerski do raise significant concerns regarding whether Daubert as interpreted by Rule 702 is sometimes too burdensome for plaintiffs with legitimate causation claims. To the extent that such concerns are valid, they need to be directly addressed in a way that permits valid claims to proceed without reopening the floodgates to junk science, not indirectly through a poorly conceived informed choice action. 
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I briefly sketched a system that would provide incentives for knowledgeable "insiders" to report safety hazards ignored by corporations. See supra note 18. My approach is consistent with, though different from, Struve's.
116.
A more radical solution to the problem of asymmetries in (and the absence of) informa tion regarding pharmaceutical safety would be to create information markets to predict the probability that the manufacturer or the FDA will, over some long time horizon, permanently recall or revoke permission to distribute a drug . See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Adminis trative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 992-93 (2004) . A potential problem with this proposal is that it may provide information market investors with an incentive to spread false information about a product. Merrell Dow pulled Bendectin from the market because of a successful public relations campaign by plaintiffs' attorneys with a financial interest in demonizing these products, not because of any underlying evidence that they were un safe. 
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It's not reassuring that Berger and Twerski, though addressing a perceived safety prob lem involving complex scientific issues, cite virtually no scientific or medical literature, preferring instead to rely on the work of law professors and judges. One of Da ubert's most imponant achieve ments has been to foc us the attention of the legal community on the underlying scientific basis of claims by experts, rather than relying on lay (or legal) notions of common sense in resolving scien tific claims. Cf Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747 (N.J. 1991) (absurdly relying on "common sense" for the proposition that PCBs cause colon cancer and foolishly relying on a law student's note for the (incorrect) assertion that 80% of all cancers are caused by exposure to envi ronmental toxins). By focusing attention, for example, on Betty Mekdeci's subjective feelings instead of the evidence she relied on, Berger and Twerski are encouraging their readers to take a giant step backwards to the pre-Daubert era.
